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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of the Court is timely invoked pursuant to 
Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, from the final order 
of District Judge VeNoy Christoffersen dismissing Plaintiffs1 
Complaint. T. R. at 586-588, Appendix Document K. The order was 
entered on July 23, 1987, based upon a memorandum decision 
rendered June 29, 1987. T. R. at 552-554, Appendix Document J. 
v 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case concerns the procedures used in 1985-86 to combine 
two corporate agricultural cooperatives, Cache Valley Dairy 
Association (CVDA) and Intermountain Milk Producers' Association 
(IMPA). 
The Plaintiffs are all directors, members and holders of 
certificates of interest in CVDA. They also sought certification 
as representatives of a class of all members and certificate 
holders. Plaintiffs also sought to act derivatively for CVDA. 
The Defendants are the two cooperatives, other directors of CVDA 
and legai counsel. 
The issues were joined upon both parties' presentation of 
motions for partial summary judgment, Defendants' motion to 
dismiss and Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 
Significant facts were undisputed. The court rendered a 
memorandum decision generally determining the legal issues in 
favor of the Defendants. Pursuant thereto, Plaintiffs' Complaint 
was ordered dismissed and class certification was denied. 
Plaintiffs appealed to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. The statutory procedures set forth in Sections 3-1-30 
et seq. are legal prerequisites to any combination of Utah 
agricultural cooperatives. 
II. Alternatively, if Section 3-1-30 et seq. is not 
mandatory, the Defendants were still obligated to follow those 
procedures by their use of a Notice and Summary and because the 
CVDA Board of Directors only approved a combination pursuant to 
2 
Section 3-1-30 et seq. 
III. Alternatively, if Defendants are not required to follow 
Section 3-1-30 et seq., then Defendants were required to follow 
the statutory procedures for corporations desiring to merge, 
consolidate or transfer all assets not in the regular course of 
business. 
IV. Alternatively, if Defendants are not required to follow 
the statutes governing combinations of agricultural cooperatives 
or even general corporate combinations, then Defendants were 
required to follow the common law. 
V. A trial court cannot render a summary decision finding 
forms of relief to be "inequitable" when there are material, 
contested issues of fact set forth in affidavits before it 
relating to that form of relief. 
VI. The trial court erred in failing to jucidate the legal 
and factual decisions it made by entering Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law or at least specifying the basis for its 
ruling. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by six individuals, Gene Brice, 
Willis Hall, Joseph R. May, Douglas Quayle, J. Rolfe Tuddenham 
and Gordon Zilles, who are each a member and holder of 
certificates of incerest as well as being an elected director of 
CVDA. The Plaintiffs also sought certification to act as class 
representatives of all members and holders of certificates of 
interest in CVDA. The Plaintiffs also sought to act derivatively 
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for CVDA. CVDA is a corporate agricultural cooperative pursuant 
to Title 3, U.C.A. 1953. Verified Complaint, T. R. at 1-26, 
Appendix Document 1^. 
This action challenges the method and legal basis used to 
combine CVDA with Intermountain Milk Producers Association 
(IMPA), another corporate agricultural cooperative. Named as 
Defendants in the action were CVDAf IMPA, other directors of CVDA 
and legal counsel along with various John Does. Id. 
The Complaint alleged that the combination of CVDA and IMPA 
was required to follow the statutory procedures set forth in 
Section 3-1-30 et seq. Further, that the statutory requirements 
were mandatory not permissive or alternative to other procedures. 
Id. Further that Defendants wholly failed to follow the 
statutory procedures requisite to a valid combination. Id. 
Defendants admitted that the statutory procedures of Section 
3-1-30 et seq. were not followed. T. R. at 197-198. Defendants 
urged, however, that the combination of the two cooperatives was 
by consolidation or transfer of all assets, therefore the 
procedures of Section 3-1-30 were not required. T. R. at 199-
200. 
Plaintiffs countered that the Notice sent to all members 
specifically stated that the combination was to be pursuant to 
Section 3-1-30 et seq.: 
The Board of Directors of Cache Valley Dairy 
Association has adopted a Resolution 
directing that a Plan of Merger 
(Consolidation) under Section 3-1-30 et. 
seq., Utah Code Annotated, be submitted to a 
vote of the members of Cache Valley Dairy 
4 
Association at a special meeting of members 
to be held at 10:30 o'clock a.m. on Monday, 
December 16, 1985, at the Smithfield Armory, 
10 East Center Street, Smithfield, Utah. 
T. R. at 26, Appendix Document A. 
The Board of Directors of CVDA never approved any other form or 
type of combination. Indeed there were no Board meetings from 
December 16, 1985, to December of 1986, nor did the board ever 
approve any other form of combination. T. R. at 380. 
Alternatively, the Plaintiffs argued that if Section 3-1-30 
et seq. is not mandatory, that the CVDA/IMPA combination would 
have to follow corporation procedures for merger, consolidation 
or transfer of all assets. 
The Plaintiffs stated their claims individually, 
derivatively and as a class alleging that there was no valid 
transfer of assets to IMPA. The acts of the Defendants were also 
alleged to be negligent and cause for recision of liens of 
encumbrances on CVDA property. Verified Complaint, T. R. at 1-
26, Appendix Document I,. 
The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging 
inconsistent causes of action because the complaint requested 
both direct and derivative relief in addition to money damages 
and recision. T. R. at 91. Plaintiffs responded to that motion. 
T. R. at 117. Apparently, the court*s final order is not based 
upon this motion or the grounds stated therein. 
The Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
on the central issue alleging that Defendants were required to 
follow the statutory procedures set out in Section 3-1-30 et seq. 
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T. R. at 48. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs urged that the 
Defendants were estopped from using any other procedure because 
of the language of the Notice sent. Id. Alternatively, 
Defendants had to follow either the corporate procedures for 
merger, consolidation or transfer of all assets or the common 
law. Id. 
The Defendants responded to Plaintiffs' motion with a cross 
motion for summary judgment alleging there is no statutory 
procedure required other than board approval. T. R. at 247. 
The court entered a memorandum decision addressing all the 
motions collectively. T. R. at 552. The decision held a class 
action inappropriate because "equity holders, producers, 
directors may have different interests'1. Id. The decision found 
Defendants had failed to follow the statutory procedures for 
merger of agricultural cooperatives. Further, that the Notice 
was defective if a merger or consolidation of agricultural 
cooperatives was contemplated. However, the court found that the 
statutory procedures were not an exclusive alternative for 
combination of agricultural cooperatives. Id. 
The decision went on to hold that ffthere can be no recession 
(sic) as there are many other entities, people involved, that 
have so changed their position in reliance" that it would be 
inequitable. Id. The court found that Plaintiffs might have a 
claim for monetary damages for the transfer of assets but made no 
holding thereon. Id. 
Plaintiffs requested the trial court to enter findings of 
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tact and conclusions of law so as to clarify the rulings. T. R. 
at 555. The court signed the order presented by Defendants1 
counsel without the clarifications requested. The order fails in 
significant part to even repeat the critical rulings of law 
rendered in the memorandum decision. Compare T. R. at 552 with 
T. R. at 586. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no evidentiary hearing held in this matter so the 
facts must be gleaned from the verified complaint of the 
Plaintiffs and the facts proven by the affidavits of Plaintiffs 
and Defendants. The trial court failed to provide a record of 
what it determined material and undisputed, however, in 
significant part the facts are undisputed. 
Plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment included a 
statement of relevant facts broken into twelve separate 
statements with specific reference to the verified complaint as 
support for the same. Defendants responded to that statement by 
admitting or clarifying each such statement. In the absence of a 
better record by the trial court, the combination of this 
interchange provides the Court with the undisputed facts. T. R. 
at 52-54, 197-199, Appendix Document L. 
Plaintiffs' No. 1; 
That Plaintiffs are directors, members, former members and/or 
equity holders of more than $50.00 in CVDA. Verified Complaint 
at 3, 5 and 6. 
Defendants1 Response to No. 1; 
/ 
Defendants agree that each plaintiff was at one time either a 
director, member, former member, or equity holder of more than 
$50.00 in CVDA. 
Plaintiffs1 No. 2: 
That CVDA and IMPA are both Utah Agricultural Cooperative 
Associations (corporations) organized and operated under Title 3, 
U.C.A. Verified Complaint at 1 and 7. 
Defendants' Response to No. 2; 
Defendants admit that CVDA and IMPA are Utah agricultural 
cooperative associations organized and operated under Title 3
 f 
Utah Code Annotated. 
Plaintiffs1 No. 3: 
That the Board of Directors of CVDA did not approve at any time a 
plan of- merger as required by Section 3-1-31. Verified Complaint 
at 25. 
Defendants1 Response to No. 3; 
Defendants admit that the Board of Directors of CVDA did not 
approve at any time a plan of merger as contemplated by Utah Code 
Ann. Section 3-1-31. In fact, no attempt was made to consummate 
a merger per Sections 3-1-30 through 41 of Utah Code Annotated. 
Plaintiffs* No. 4; 
That the Notice attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true copy of 
the Notice used to advertise a meeting to consider the merger of 
CVDA into IMPA. Verified Complaint at 26. 
NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION 
The Board of Directors of Cache Valley Dairy 
Association has adopted a Resolution directing that a 
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Plan of Merger (Consolidation) under Section 3-1-30 et. 
seq., Utah Code Annotated, be submitted to a vote of 
the members of the Cache Valley Dairy Association at a 
special meeting of members to be held at 10:30 o'clock 
a cm. on Monday, December 16, 1985, at the Smithfield 
Armory, 10 East Center Street, Smithfield, Utah. 
The principal purpose of the meeting is to 
consider and vote upon the Plan of Merger 
(Consolidation) of Cache Valley Dairy Association, 
Western General Dairies, Inc., Star Valley Producers, 
Inc., and Lake Mead Cooperative Association into 
Intermountain Milk Producers Association. 
A summary of the Plan of Merger (Consolidation) is 
enclosed with this Notice. A full copy of the plan 
shall be furnished to any member upon request without 
charge. Requests should be made to Intermountain Milk 
Producers Association, 195 West 7200 South, Midvale, UT 
84047. 
Passage of this plan will require a simple 
majority of the members present at the meeting and 
voting thereon. 
By order of the President as of this 25th day of 
November, 1985. 
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION 
By I si Wm. L. Lindley 
President 
SUMMARY OF PLAN OF MERGER (CONSOLIDATION) 
1. Cache Valley Dairy Association, Western 
General Dairies, Inc., Lake Mead Cooperative 
Association and Star Valley Producers, Inc., 
( MConsolidating Cooperatives11) propose to consolidate 
their assets into Intermountain Milk Producers 
Association, formed under Title 3, Utah Code Annotated, 
as an agricultural cooperative association (ffIMPAff). 
2. The terms and conditions are: 1) the 
Consolidating Cooperatives will transfer to IMPA all of 
their assets at book value in exchange for the promise 
by IMPA to assume all liabilities of said cooperatives; 
b) All membership agreements held by said cooperatives 
shall be assigned to and assumed by IMPA in accordance 
with their terms; c) all milk base held by members 
shall become milk base of IMPA on a pound-for-pound 
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basis subject to the same rules, regulations and 
agreements in effect on the day the plan is adopted; d) 
all equities held by members of said cooperatives shall 
become equities of IMPA on a dollar-for-dollar basis 
subject to existing rules, regulations and agreements; 
f) all agreements, contracts, claims and obligations 
whatsoever, of said cooperatives shall be assumed by 
IMPA as though originally held by IMPA; g) All 
employees employed by said cooperatives as of the date 
of approval of the plan shall become employees of IMPA 
and all retirement plans, vacation accruals or other 
employee benefits shall be assumed by IMPA; and h) all 
other provisions of the Agreement of Merger 
(Consolidation). 
3. The surviving corporation, IMPA, shall be 
governed by the Utah Uniform Agricultural Cooperative 
Association Act. 
4. No changes will be required in the Articles 
of Incorporation of IMPA. 
5. The eighteen (18) board members of IMPA shall 
establish districts which shall include all areas in 
which IMPA members reside and shall arrange for the 
election of directors from said districts at the fall 
1986 district meetings for seating at the annual 
meeting of IMPA in January 1987. 
b. The Presidents and Secretaries of the 
respective Consolidating Cooperatives shall execute 
such documents as are necessary to carry out the plan. 
Defendants' Response to No. 4; 
Defendants admit that the notice attached to plaintiffs' memo as 
Exhibit A is a true copy of the notice used to advertise a 
meeting to consider the transaction that had been under 
consideration since June of 1984. Defendants dispute plaintiffs1 
characterization that the meeting was to consider a "merger11 of 
CVDA into IMPA. 
Plaintiffs1 No. 5; 
That said notice states that the merger is to be completed in 
accordance with Section 3-1-30 et seq. Verified Complaint at 27. 
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Defendants1 Response to No, 5: 
Defendants dispute that the notice "states that the merger is to 
be contemplated in accordance with Section 3-1-30, et seq." The 
notice does refer to Section 3-1-30. However, a summary of the 
plan is attached to the notice, and paragraph 2 of the summary of 
the plan clearly sets forth the nature of the transaction, i.e., 
a transfer of assets, an assignment of liabilities, etc. 
Plaintiffs1 No. 6: 
That in clear violation of Section 3-1-33, holders of 
certificates of interest (Equity Holders) in CVDA of $50.00 or 
more were not provided with any notice whatsoever of a merger or 
of any meeting or specifically of the CVDA special meeting of 
members held on December 16, 1985, to consider the IMPA plan of 
merger. Verified Complaint at 28. 
Defendantst Response to No. 6: 
Defendants admit that equity holders were not given notice. 
Defendants dispute that there is any requirement to give equity 
holders notice of the contemplated transaction. Defendants 
dispute that equity holders had any right to vote. 
Plaintiffs' No. 7: 
That at the said special meeting Equity Holders of $50.00 or more 
were not allowed to vote on the plan of merger. Verified 
Complaint at 29. 
Defendants1 Response to No. 7; 
Defendants admit that at the meeting equity holders were not 
allowed to vote. 
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Plaintiffs' No, 8: 
That at the said special meeting, no voting was allowed by 
delegate or proxy. Verified Complaint at 30. 
Defendants1 Response to No. 8; 
Defendants admit that at the meeting no voting was allowed by 
delegate or proxy. 
Plaintiffs1 No. 9: 
That Defendant CVDA and Defendant IMPA have refused to 
acknowledge dissenter's rights pursuant to Section 3-1-39. 
Verified Complaint at 32. 
Defendants1 Response to No. 9: 
Defendants admit that there has been no award of dissenter's 
rights pursuant to Section 3-1-39. However, no one, including 
these plaintiffs, has asserted dissenter's rights pursuant to 
Section 3-1-39. 
Plaintiffs No. 10: 
There have been no Articles of Merger approved or even presented 
to the Board of Directors of CVDA nor have they been filed with 
the Secretary of State nor has a Certificate of Merger been 
obtained. Verified Complaint at 34. 
Detendants' Response to No. 10: 
Defendants admit that there have been no articles of merger 
approved or presented to the Board of Directors of CVD, nor filed 
with the Secretary of State, nor has the Certificate of Merger 
been obtained. 
Plaintiffs' No. 11: 
12 
That all the assets and goodwill of CVDA have been purportedly 
assigned to IMPA. Verified Complaint at 36. 
Defendants1 Response to No. 11; 
Defendants admit that all the assets and goodwill of CVDA have 
been assigned to IMPA. 
Plaintiffs1 No. 12: 
That IMPA has appropriated CVDA's plants, personnel and labels to 
its own use. IMPA has treated this property in every way as its 
own since in or about December 1985. Verified Complaint at 37. 
Defendants' Response to No. 12; 
Defendants admit that all the assets and goodwill of CVDA have 
been assigned to IMPA, and that IMPA has treated this property in 
every way as property that has been assigned to IMPA. Defendants 
do not agree with plaintiffs argumentative characterization that 
IMPA has "appropriated CVDAfs assets". 
Subsequently, Defendant tendered a document they labeled as 
being "Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts" numbering the 
same in Paragraphs 1 through 39. T. R. at 140-151. Plaintiffs 
responded admitting, denying and/or clarifying the same with 
Plaintiffs1 Affidavits. This provided some additional facts on 
which the trial court could base its decision. T. R. at 227-238. 
The Defendants1 Statement and Plaintiffs' Response with the 
interchange as to each fact is included in its entirety in the 
Appendix as Document L. 
The Plaintiffs submitted memoranda in support of their 
motions for partial summary judgment and class certification. T^ 
13 
R. at 48, 104. The Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs1 
complaint and alternatively for summary judgment. T. R. at 91, 
177, 224. Each side opposed the other's motions. A hearing was 
held and the various motions were argued. 
Subsequently, on June 29, 1987, the trial court rendered a 
memorandum decision. T. R. at 552. The Defendants tendered a 
proposed order to the court to which Plaintiffs duly objected. 
T. R. at 555. The basis of the objection was the failure to 
provide findings of fact and conclusions of law or clarification 
regarding the general findings, legal conclusions, denial of 
class certification and whether the decision was based upon the 
Defendants* motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Id. Over 
Plaintiffs1 objections the court entered the order as presented. 
T. R. at 586. 
It is from this Order that the Plaintiffs appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The statutory procedures set forth in Sections 3-1-30 et 
seq. are legal prerequisites to any combination of Utah 
agricultural cooperatives. 
The legislative enactment, Section 3-1-30 et seq., is 
exclusive and mandatory setting all authority given agricultural 
cooperatives to combine whether that be by merger, consolidation 
or transfer of assets. 
II. Alternatively, if Section 3-1-30 et seq. is not 
mandatory, the Defendants were still obligated to follow those 
procedures by their use of a Notice and Summary and because the 
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CVDA Board of Directors only approved a combination pursuant to 
Section 3-1-30 et seq. 
The factual circumstances herein estop the Defendants from 
anything other than a Section 3-1-30 combination. The CVDA Board 
never approved any other type of combination. 
III. Alternatively, if Defendants are not required to follow 
Section 3-1-30 et seq.f then Defendants were required to follow 
the statutory procedures for corporations desiring to merge, 
consolidate or transfer all assets not in the regular course of 
business. 
If Section 3-1-30 et seq. is not the exclusive procedure, 
then Defendants would be required to follow the similar statutory 
procedures for business or non-profit corporations. The 
Defendants cannot make new law. The Defendants did not follow 
those procedures either. 
IV. Alternatively, if Defendants are not required to follow 
the statutes governing combinations of agricultural cooperatives 
or even general corporate combinations, then Defendants were 
required to follow the common law. 
The common law in the absence of statutory modification 
requires unanimous consent from stockholders for merger, 
consolidation or transfer of all assets. No such consent was 
obtained by Defendants. 
V. A trial court cannot render a summary decision finding 
forms of relief to be "inequitable" when there are material, 
contested issues of fact set forth in affidavits before it 
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relating to that form or relief. 
The trial record indicates significant factual disputes 
relative to the "equity" of various remedies. The courtfs 
summary decision was in the face of disputed facts and premature. 
VI. The trial court erred in failing to elucidate the legal 
and factual decisions it made by entering findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or at least specifying the basis for its 
ruling. 
There is no adequate basis for the trial court rulings 
particularly with respect to Plaintiffs1 motion for class 
certification. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTORY PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN SECTION 3-1-30 ET 
SEQ. ARE LEGAL PREREQUISITES TO ANY COMBINATION OF UTAH 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES. 
CVDA and IMPA are both specialized corporations known as 
agricultural cooperative associations pursuant to Section 3-1-1, 
et seq. U.C.A. 1953. Sections 1-29 of Title 3 were adopted in 
1937. In a 1965 Act, Sections 30-41 were added to the original 
sections with an avowed purpose: 
LTJo permit merger of agricultural co-operative 
associations with other corporations, domestic or 
foreign; establishing the procedure for said mergers 
and the rights and privileges, duties and obligations 
of the corporations surviving said merger and of the 
members and shareholders of each party to the merger. 
Title of Act. See Section 3-1-30, U.C.A. [Emphasis added.] 
This law provides a specific set of procedures and 
guidelines: 
1. The Board of Directors must approve by resolution a 
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"plan of merger'1. 
2. Notice of a meeting of members to approve the plan 
must be given to every member of record or equity holder (of 
$50.00 or more). 
3. Equity holders (of $50.00 value or more) are 
entitled to vote irrespective of whether they are members as 
defined by the corporate Articles of Incorporation or 
Bylaws. 
4. Voting at the meeting shall be in person, by proxy 
or by delegate. 
5. Upon approval by a majority vote at the meeting, 
articles of merger shall be executed and filed with the 
Secretary of State. 
The general and accepted rule is that corporations, as 
creatures of statute, can only merge or consolidate in accordance 
with legislative enactment. 
Corporations have the right and the power to 
consolidate or merge only by the consent and authority 
of the legislature. The consent of the state to a 
valid consolidation or merger must be clearly and 
distinctly expressed; it is never implied, and exists 
only by virtue of plain legislative enactment. 
The power of the several states to authorize the 
consolidation or merger of corporations in the absence 
of special constitutional restrictions is undoubted. 
Statutory provisions authorizing merger of corporations 
have been held not unconstitutional . . . . 
19 Am.Jur.2d Section 2608 at 419 [citations omittedj. 
The constitutional power of a state to restrict 
the consolidation or merger of corporations is 
indisputable. . . since legislative sanction is 
essential to the right of corporations to consolidate 
or merge, the legislature may attach to the grant such 
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conditions, and impose such terms, as it chooses. 
Id. at Section 2611 at 442. [citations omitted]. 
The Utah legislature adopted the specific procedural 
provisions for combination of agricultural cooperatives set forth 
in Sections 3-1-30 et seq. These provisions provide the 
necessary legislative authority to allow cooperative associations 
to combine. The Defendants urge that these statutory procedures 
can simply be circumvented by terming the combination a 
"consolidation" or by doing a "transfer of assets". 
The clear intent of Section 3-1-30 et seq. is to provide an 
exclusive procedure for merger/consolidation/transfer of assets 
of agricultural cooperatives. While the language uses the word 
"merger" the description of procedures encompasses the technical 
definitions of "consolidation" and "transfer of assets". 
The authorities familiar with corporate and cooperative law 
broadly disagree with the right of the Defendants to disregard 
statutory prerequisites: 
There are statutes in most* states providing for the 
merger or consolidation of corporations, including 
cooperative corporations. Whenever it is proposed to 
merge or consolidate cooperatives, these statutes must 
be followed strictly . . . 
Statutory provisions for merger or consolidation in 
existence at the time a person becomes a stockholder in 
a corporation become a part of his contract with the 
corporation. 
Legal Phases of Farmer Cooperatives, United States Department of 
Agriculture (1976) at 111-112. [emphasis added]. 
Defendants are asking the court to make "new law". The 
trial court was asked to create this "new law" so as to authorize 
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what the Defendants had already done. T. R. at 78-83, Appendix 
Document H. It is common and accepted knowledge that 
corporations and cooperatives are creatures of statutory birth 
and origin calling upon legislative grant for the exercise of 
powers. Neither the trial court nor any other can make "new law" 
for corporations and cooperatives. It can interpret and define 
statutory grants, but it cannot create them. 
The Plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment called 
for the simple application of well accepted doctrines of 
statutory interpretation. The legal maxim, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion 
of another), has significant application here. The Utah State 
Legislature has set forth a detailed and protective procedure 
allowing the combination of agricultural cooperatives. The 
legislature, with the provision of one set of procedures, has 
excluded any alternatives. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, IF SECTION 3-1-30 ET SEQ. IS NOT 
MANDATORY, THE DEFENDANTS WERE STILL OBLIGATED TO 
FOLLOW THOSE PROCEDURES BY THEIR USE OF A NOTICE AND 
SUMMARY AND BECAUSE THE CVDA BOARD OF DIRECTORS ONLY 
APPROVED A COMBINATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 3-1-30 ET 
SEQ. 
The producers, but not equity holders, of CVDA did receive a 
written Notice from their Board of Directors relative to their 
intent % 
- NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION 
The Board of Directors of Cache Valley Dairy 
Association has adopted a Resolution directing that a 
Plan of Merger (Consolidation) under Section 3-1-30 et 
seg., Utah Code Annotated, be submitted to a vote of 
the members of Cache Valley Dairy Association at a 
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special meeting of members to be held at 10:30 o'clock 
a.m. on Monday, December 16, 1985, at the Smithfield 
Armory, 10 East Center Street, Smithfield, Utah. 
The principal purpose of the meeting is to 
consider and vote upon the Plan of Merger 
(Consolidation) of Cache Valley Dairy Association . . . 
Notice dated November 25, 1985, signed by William Lindley, 
President of CVDA. T. R. at 26, 63, 324, Appendix Document A. 
The Notice speaks for itself. Indeed, the accompanying Summary 
of Plan of Merger (Consolidation) tracks with the requirements of 
Section 3-1-31 and 3-1-32. T. R. at 64, 325, Appendix Document 
B. There were no meetings of the Board of Directors of CVDA from 
the date this Notice was authorized to the date all CVDA assets 
were purportedly transferred or assigned to IMPA. 
The Board's own Notice binds CVDA to the procedures set 
forth at Section 3-1-30 et seq. Yet CVDA and IMPA wholly failed 
to follow the spirit and the substance of the statutes cited in 
the Notice. 
1. There was no Resolution of the CVDA Board of Directors 
approving a Plan of Merger. See Section 3-1-31, U.C.A. 
1953. 
2. Equity Holders of more than $50.00 were not given 
notice nor right to vote. See Section 3-1-33, Id. 
3. Voting by representative or proxy was not allowed. See 
Section 3-1-35, Id. 
4. No Articles of Merger were approved or filed. See 
Section 3-1-36, Id. 
5. No dissenter's rights were allowed. See Section 3-1-
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40, Id. T. R, at 52-54, 197-199, Appendix Document L. 
The Board of Directors of CVDA clearly approved the 
submission of the decision of whether to "merge the co-op" to the 
members. T. R. at 380, Appendix Document D. At that meeting the 
members present did vote their approval. Later, IMPA purported 
to abandon this Plan of Merger pursuant to "statute's a clear 
reference to the last paragraph of Section 3-1-35, U.C.A. 1953. 
See IMPA Minutes. T. R. at 326, Appendix Document E. 
Interestingly, it is IMPA not CVDA which purports to abandon this 
Plan. 
The only combination of any form ever approved by the Board 
of CVDA was a statutory, Section 3-1-30 et seq., "merger". 
Albeit this was done with faulty compliance with required legal 
procedures. Then with further faulty procedures it was submitted 
to some of the members who approved. Later the IMPA Board 
purports to abandon the "merger" plan and proceed with a transfer 
of assets. The latter was never considered or approved by the 
CVDA Board. It was never even submitted to that Board nor to the 
CVDA members. The CVDA Board's approval must be found in its 
Board Minutes of November 27, 1985, for there were no further 
CVDA Board meetings until December 1986 when the controversy 
herein was argued. 
There were simply no CVDA meetings wherein anything was 
abandoned, or wherein alternative forms of combination could be 
considered much less approved. The bulk of the CVDA Board 
members understood that a merger had occurred and that the two 
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organizations were going to be joined pursuant to Section 3-1-30 
et seq. No notice whatsoever was given to them of a purported 
abandonment by IMPA. T. R. at 326, Appendix Document E. Nor was 
any notice given that there was to be a "transfer of assets" as 
an alternative to the merger. 
The officers who signed documents to effectuate the 
"transfer of assets" believed they were effectuating the 
statutory merger approved. See Summary, T. R. at 64, Appendix 
Document B, which itself refers to transfers as a part' of the 
statutory merger. These directors and officers as laymen were 
not aware of requisite procedures of Section 3-1-30 et seq. but 
relied upon legal counsel to the effect that the necessary steps 
were being implemented. The members were in a similar position, 
having received the Notice and Summary they would presume a 
Section 3-1-30 statutory merger was being completed. They have a 
right to believe that given the communications received. 
The abandonment is essentially a secret, unpublished to 
anyone except the IMPA Board. When individuals attempted to 
assert legal rights under Section 3-1-30, i. e. dissenter's 
rights then they were met with the argument that there was no 
"merger" but a consolidation or transfer of assets. Thus the 
provisions of Section 3-1-30 et seq. have no application. See 
Letter of Randon Wilson dated November 19, 1986, T. R. at 65-77, 
Appendix Document F and Letter of Randon Wilson dated March 9, 
1987, Appendix Document H. Attorney Wilson was counsel for IMPA 
and legal architect and drafter of the Notice, Summary, Letter of 
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Intent and IMPA Resolution of December 19, 1985, and of the 
subsequent documents of transfer signed in August of 1986. See 
T. R. at 78, Appendix Document G. 
Legal counsel for IMPA has advanced the theory that a 
"transfer of assets" was approved by the CVDA Board before the 
consolidation with IMPA even commenced. See Letter of Randon 
Wilson dated November 19, 1986, Page 4, Subsection (4) and 
response. T. R. at 68, Appendix Document F. This can only be a 
reference to the Letter of Intent in which no such thing is 
approved. See Letter of Intent, T. R. at 328-333, Appendix 
Document C. The statement by Attorney Wilson is also an 
admission that there was no further approval considered or even 
sought from the CVDA Board after December of 1985. The last 
meeting of directors was actually on November 27, 1985. 
The Defendants are bound to the procedures of Section 3-1-30 
et seq. by their Notice and Summary and the CVDA Board approvals. 
Even were there alternative legal mechanisms which could be used 
to combine, the election was clearly made and never changed to 
proceed pursuant to Section 3-1-30 et seq. 
III. ALTERNATIVELY, IF DEFENDANTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FOLLOW 
SECTION 3-1-30 ET SEQ., THEN DEFENDANTS WERE REQUIRED 
TO FOLLOW THE STATUTORY PROCEDURES FOR CORPORATIONS 
DESIRING TO MERGE, CONSOLIDATE OR TRANSFER ALL ASSETS 
NOT IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS. 
Agricultural cooperative law is supplemented by general 
corporate statutory enactments. The statute providing for 
agricultural cooperatives includes this reference to general 
corporate enactments by granting to them 
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[tjhe rights, powers and privileges granted by the laws 
of this state to corporations generally, excepting such 
as are inconsistent with the express provisions of this 
act. 
Section 3-1-9, U.C.A. 1953. Lacking an express inconsistency in 
the agricultural cooperative section, supplementary reference can 
be to the legislative grants to corporations. 
It is the Plaintiffs' position that the procedure set forth 
at Section 3-1-30, et seq. encompasses all legislative authority 
and hence all authority of agricultural cooperatives to combine; 
that there are ''express provisions" governing combination. 
However, if that legal interpretation is wrong, an agricultural 
cooperative in order to combine would still be required to. follow 
the Business Corporation Act procedures, 16-10-66, et seq., or 
alternatively the Nonprofit Corporation Act procedures 16-6-54, 
et seq. This is the clear mandate of Section 3-1-9. 
The Defendants will find no relief in these other corporate 
procedures for merger, consolidation or transfer of assets for 
they require in .near identical fashion the steps incident to 
Section 3-1-30, et seq. The essentials being Board approval of a 
plan of merger or consolidation, notice to all stockholders and a 
subsequent vote thereon by all stockholders. Section 16-10-68, 
et seq. That statute specifically provides 
[ejach outstanding share of each such corporation shall 
be entitled to vote . . . whether or not such share has 
voting rights under the provisions of the Articles of 
Incorporation of such corporation. 
Id. Upon majority vote approval, articles of merger or 
consolidation are to be filed with the Secretary of State. 
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Similar procedures govern the sale or assignment of all or 
substantially all of a corporation's assets• Again this 
procedure requires all stockholders be given notice and the right 
to vote. Section 16-10-75, et seq. 
Dissenter's rights exist under all of these forms of 
consolidation. Each stockholder has a right to have his interest 
appraised and paid be it a merger, consolidation or transfer of 
assets. 
There is no statutory basis for the Defendants' actions in 
combining CVDA into IMPA. Their admission of a failure to follow 
the statutory procedures of the agricultural cooperative statute 
compels them to admit a like failure to follow the similar 
statutory procedures of the Nonprofit and Business Corporation 
Acts. 
IV. ALTERNATIVELY, IF DEFENDANTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FOLLOW 
THE STATUTES GOVERNING COMBINATIONS OF AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATIVES OR EVEN GENERAL CORPORATE COMBINATIONS, 
THEN DEFENDANTS WERE REQUIRED TO FOLLOW THE COMMON LAW. 
In the event legislative authority was granted to 
corporations for merger, consolidation or transfer of all assets 
without a description of the necessary procedures, common law 
supplied those: 
[Cjommon law required the unanimous consent of 
stockholders to carry out major corporate transactions, 
such as a merger or consolidation of the corporation, 
or a sale of all or substantially all of its assets. 
This rule permitted a minority of stockholders to block 
effectively the implementation of those decisions or 
policies which while conceivably beneficial to the 
corporation in some cases, and while so recognized by 
the majority stockholders, were not to the liking of 
the remaining few. 
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18A Am. Jur. 2d,, Section 805 at 677-678, Because of the 
harshness of this common law rule, statutory enactments now 
regularly modify common law removing the need for unanimous 
consent by providing for appraisal and payment to dissenters. 
This is what Utah laws have done. But if the Defendants were 
successful in arguing they were bound by no statutory enactments, 
they would then fall back on this common law. Clearly, the 
Defendants have not complied with the common law. 
V. A TRIAL COURT CANNOT RENDER A SUMMARY DECISION FINDING 
FORMS OF RELIEF TO BE "INEQUITABLE" WHEN THERE ARE 
MATERIAL, CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT SET FORTH IN 
AFFIDAVITS BEFORE IT RELATING TO THAT FORM OF RELIEF. 
The trial court's determination on this issue is set forth 
in its memorandum decision as follows: 
The Court holds that first there can be no recession as 
there are many entities, people involved, that have so 
changed their position in reliance upon the transfer of 
assets that it would be inequitable for the Court to 
consider the remedies of recession and restitution. 
T. R. at 552, Appendix Document J. This appears to be a factual 
determination, but no facts are recited which are found first to 
be undisputed and secondly applicable to this determination. The 
trial court's final order over Plaintiffs1 objection provides no 
clarification. T. R. at 586, Appendix Document K. 
This determination forecloses certain important remedies 
from later consideration. Interestingly, the Plaintiffs only 
asked for recision in their fifth cause of action against 
unidentifiea Sam Soes 1-10 who took security positions against 
CVDA assets from IMPA. These persons are not even identified 
much less parties to the action as of the trial court's summary 
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decision. 
Plaintiffs' first cause of action asks first for money 
damages and then alternatively for injunctive relief finding IMPA 
not to be the successor to CVDA anc requiring possession and use 
of the CVDA assets and tradenames be returned to CVDA. Perhaps 
the trial court had reference to this alternative relief in 
making its ruling. However, a transfer of assets "void ab 
initio" does not require recision or restitution remedies. The 
court is merely being asked to enforce the actual legal status 
between parties; that is, that IMPA has no rights in CVDA assets 
as it has acquired nothing. 
The trial court's memorandum decision in its discussion of 
remedies should make a factual finding of inequity based upon 
undisputed facts. As is evident from the interchange of facts, 
the allegations of inequity or equity of pulling the cooperatives 
apart are squarely contested by Defendants and Plaintiffs. See 
Fact Statements 23-25, 28-32, Appendix Document L. This is 
simply not the type of area which a trial court can rule upon 
without full evidentiary hearing. This remedy has any number of 
possible permutations of how and or what parts could be divided 
or separated. The trial court's ruling is entirely premature. 
It lacks any full consideration of a wide range of alternatives. 
More critically it decides an issue which is factually disputed. 
The trial court found that Plaintiffs ,?may have a cause of 
action for monetary damages by reason of the elimination of all 
of the assets of CVD which destroys the value of their equity 
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rights". T. R. at 552, Appendix Document J. The trial court 
found there are "no indications of a request for such damages in 
the complaint". Id. The court found instead that Plaintiffs 
relied upon "relief by reason of an invalid merger". Id. 
Indeed Plaintiffs did allege an "invalid merger" and 
noncompliance with statutory prerequisites. However, it is the 
Defendants who labeled the combination a "merger". The term as 
generally used encompasses those other forms of combination. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not complain solely of the "invalid 
merger" they also complained very specifically that "the assets 
and equity of CVD have been illegally transferred, mortgaged, 
sold, liened, assigned or otherwise seriously impaired". 
Verified Complaint, Paragraph 36. Further, that IMPA without 
right sold milk products of CVDA, used its trade names and 
usurped and appropriated the business. Id. at Paragraph 37. 
Further, that as a result the assets of CVD were diluted and 
dissipated by the Defendants. As a result Plaintiffs requested 
money damages of FIFTY FIVE MILLION DOLLARS ($55,000,000.00). 
Id. at Paragraphs 38 and 39, 
The trial court's discussion of forms of relief indicates 
error. The court could not in summary fashion on disputed facts 
exclude remedies. That decision was entirely premature for a 
court which will later be called to fashion a remedy as a court 
of equity. The court's statement that the complaint is limited 
to "merger" and does not ask for money damages is disproved by 
the verified complaint's own language. 
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The Defendants have created a moving target shifting names 
from "merger" to "consolidation" to "transfer of assets". It is 
they who have used these names interchangeably without any heed 
to technical significance. The Plaintiffs1 complaint is that the 
combination by whatever name it is now called is not in 
accordance with legal requirements. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ELUCIDATE THE LEGAL 
AND FACTUAL DECISIONS IT MADE BY ENTERING FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR AT LEAST SPECIFYING THE 
BASIS FOR ITS RULING. 
The Plaintiffs duly objected to the form of the order 
presented because it didn't follow the memorandum decision or 
elucidate factual or legal determinations. T. R. at 555. 
The court ; made specific findings and conclusions which 
should be set out in a statement of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., or at the 
very minimum, the memorandum decision should be incorporated in 
the order as the findings and conclusions. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to instruction from the Court by 
what mechanism Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed, i.e., pursuant 
to Defendants' motion to dismiss or pursuant to Defendants• 
motion for summary judgment, or both. 
In the court's memorandum decision, it specifically holds 
that the class action is not appropriate because equity holders, 
producers and directors "may have different interests" and goes 
on to state that the class action is inappropriate "for other 
reasons that will be better understood as set forth in the body 
of this memorandum decision". The decision then fails to later 
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clarify. Pursuant to Rule 23, U.R.C.P., the order should include 
the specific reasons for the inappropriateness of the class 
action so that Plaintiffs could propose alternative 
representatives and/or particular issues for particular class 
action causes or propose that the class be divided into sub-
classes, all pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4)(A)(B), U.R.C.P. 
Finally, the court, in its memorandum decision, holds that a 
merger or consolidation is "not an exclusive alternative to a 
change or affecting the consolidation by its change of assets" 
but fails to conclude what other alternatives are available and 
pursuant to what authority. 
Since the court's memorandum decision is a final order 
affecting the complete summary disposition of the action, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to clear and specific findings and 
conclusions stating the courts basis and reasons for its action. 
This is also required for the necessary appeal process. The 
trial court erred in this failure specifically with respect to 
the request for class certification. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs have argued first that Defendants must follow 
as a statutory exclusive for combination, Section 3-1-30 et seq. 
As a first backup argument, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are 
bound by their own notice and the only authorization ever 
obtained from the CVDA Board which was to complete a "merger". 
As a second backup argument, Plaintiffs have argued that if 
Defendants are not bound by Section 3-1-30 et seq. or their own 
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acts, they must follow corporate law respecting a "consolidation" 
or "transfer of assets". As yet a third backup argument, 
Defendants must follow common laws. 
Defendantsf acts fail each of these standards whether it be 
a "merger", "consolidation" or "transfer of assets". Defendants 
have no authority for their activities by whatever name they use. 
The trial court mischaracterizes Plaintiffs' complaint as being 
based solely upon a failure to follow the statutory merger 
procedure when Plaintiffs allege violation under each alternative 
by alleging the transfer of assets was illegal and unauthorized. 
The Plaintiffs1 request relief from this Court as follows: 
1. A determination that any combination of agricultural 
cooperatives must be completed in accordance with the 
statutory procedures of Section 3-1-30 et seq. 
2. Alternatively, that the activities of Defendants and 
tne approval of the CVDA Board require a statutory 
merger pursuant to Section 3-1-30 et seq. 
3. Alternatively, that any combination of agricultural 
cooperatives must follow the statutory procedures of 
Section 3-1-30 et seq. or the general corporate 
procedures set forth for business or non-profit 
corporations by statute. 
4. Alternatively, that the Defendants must follow the 
common law requirement of unanimous consent of 
stockholders. 
5. A reversal of the trial court's decision relative to 
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forms of relief it being based on disputed facts and 
premature for a court of equity. 
6. Prospective direction to the trial court to proceed 
with a proper determination of class certification and 
to make appropriate findings and conclusions in that 
and ail other regards. 
DATED this ffi day of March, 1988. 
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